Dynamic Labour Supply Effects of Childcare Subsidies: Evidence from a Canadian Natural Experiment on Low-Fee Universal Child Care by Lefebvre, Pierre et al.
      
Lefebvre : Université du Québec à Montréal (UQAM) and  Inter-university Centre on Risk, Economic Policies and 
Employment (CIRPEE). Address for correspondence : Pierre Lefebvre, Economics, UQAM, CP 8888, Succ. Centre-
Ville, Montréal, QC, Canada H3C 3P8; Tel.: 514-987-3000 #8373; Fax: 514-987-8494 
lefebvre.pierre@uqam.ca 
Merrigan: UQAM and CIRPEE 
Verstraete: UQAM   
 
The analysis is based on Statistics Canada’s Survey on Labour and Income Dynamic (SLID) restricted-access Micro 
Data Files, which contain anonymized data collected in the SLID and are available at the Québec Inter-university 
Centre for Social Statistics (QICSS), one of the Canadian Research Data Center network. All computations on these 
micro-data were prepared by the authors who assume the responsibility for the use and interpretation of these data. 
This research was funded by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada and the Fonds 
québécois de la recherche sur la société et la culture. We would like to thank participants at the Annual Symposium 
of the Population, Work and Family Research Collaboration (Gatineau, December 2006), ESPE Conference 
(Chicago, June 2007), SCSE (Québec, June 2007) EALE Conference (Oslo, September 2007). 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Cahier de recherche/Working Paper 08-24 
 
 
 
Dynamic Labour Supply Effects of Childcare Subsidies: Evidence from a 
Canadian Natural Experiment on Low-Fee Universal Child Care 
 
 
Pierre Lefebvre 
Philip Merrigan 
Matthieu Verstraete 
 
 
Septembre/September 2008 
Abstract:  
This paper shows that a temporary incentive to join the labor market or to work more can 
also produce substantial life-cycle labor supply effects. On September 1997, a new 
childcare policy was initiated by the provincial government of Québec, the second most 
populous province in Canada. Licensed and regulated providers of childcare services 
began offering day care spaces at the subsidized fee of $5 per day per child for children 
aged 4. In successive years, the government reduced the age requirement, created new 
childcare facilities and spaces, and paid for the additional costs entailed by this low-fee 
policy. No such important policy changes for preschool (including kindergarten) children 
were enacted in the nine other Canadian provinces over the years 1997 to 2004. Using 
annual data drawn from Statistics Canada’s Survey on Labour and Income Dynamic and 
a difference-in-differences quasi-experimental methodology, the paper estimates the 
dynamic labor supply effects of the program. The results demonstrate that the policy had 
long-term labor supply effects on mothers who benefited from the program when their 
child was less than 6. A striking feature of the results is that they are driven by changes 
in the labor supply of less educated mothers. 
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1. Introduction 
On September 1 1997, a new childcare policy was initiated by the provincial government of 
Québec, the second most populous province in Canada. Childcare service providers licensed by the 
Department of the Family began offering day care spaces at the reduced parental fee of $5 per day 
per child for children aged 4 (all monetary amounts are expressed in Canadian dollars). In successive 
years, the government reduced the age requirement and by September 2000, the low-fee policy 
applied to all children aged 0 to 59 months (not eligible for kindergarten). The government also 
promised to progressively increase the number of subsidized $5 per day spaces, targeting a number 
of 200,000 for 2007. The number of subsidized spaces increased from 74,000 partially subsidized 
spaces (available in early 1997) to 198,000 spaces, totally subsidized, by March 2007. Families’ 
childcare arrangements changed dramatically over time as the policy favored regulated subsidized 
center-based care (as well as family-based care under the supervision of subsidized not-for-profit 
centers). This new childcare regime was integrated with a policy of full-time instead of half-day 
publicly-provided kindergarten in a school setting and with $5 per day before- and after-school day 
care for kindergarten-age and grade-school children. Since January 1 2004, the fee per day has been 
fixed at $7 rather than $5 for both type of childcare services (preschool and those offered within 
public schools). 
Lefebvre and Merrigan (2008), with annual data from 1993 to 2002 drawn from Statistics 
Canada’s Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics (SLID) and a difference-in-differences (DD) 
approach, estimate a substantial effect of the policy on a diversity of labour supply indicators 
(participation, annual weeks and hours worked, and earned income) for a sample of Canadian 
mothers with 1 to 5-year-olds children. The estimated effect of the policy on the participation of 
mothers with preschool children in Québec for year 2002 is 8.1 percentage points (the observed 
participation rate is 69 percent in 2002). In addition, Baker et al. (2005) using the first two cycles 
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(1994 and 1996) and the last two cycles (2000 and 2002) from Statistics Canada’s National 
Longitudinal Survey of Children and Youth (NLSCY), analyze the impact of Québec’s childcare 
policy on childcare use, maternal work (mothers in two-parent families only), and diverse behavioral 
outcomes measuring the “well-being” of both children (0 to 4-year-olds or sub-samples of those 
children) and parents. They also produce estimates showing substantial labour supply effects of the 
policy. This unexpected low-fee policy changed substantially the labour supply of mothers with 
preschool children. 
The identification of dynamic or life-cycle mechanisms explaining labour supply choices are 
often plagued by simultaneity problems. In this paper, we use this Canadian “natural experiment” to 
overcome simultaneity issues and test the hypothesis that childcare subsidies incentives can also 
cause changes in the labour supply of mothers when the policy is no longer contemporaneously 
effective, that is when all the mother’s children are in school. There are several dynamic mechanisms 
that can explain why childcare subsidies can have lasting effects on labour supply. For example, the 
subsidy, by increasing labour force experience when the child is young, has positive effects on future 
wages which can further increase labour supply. A more precise description of these life-cycle 
mechanisms will be made in section 4. The identification strategy is based on the fact that several 
cohorts of mothers affected by the program no longer have children aged from 0 to 5 in their 
household and no longer benefit from the childcare subsidies directed to preschool children. Once all 
children are in school there is no longer any major relative advantage for Québec mothers over those 
in the Rest of Canada (RofC) in terms of fixed costs of labour force participation. A static model 
predicts that childcare policies targeted towards mothers with no preschool child will have no effect 
on mothers with all children in school. 
In order to evaluate the potential long-term or life-cycle effects of Québec’s universal childcare 
policy, both DD and difference-in-difference-in-differences (DDD) estimators are computed with 
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annual data from the SLID (1996 to 2004) for two groups of Québec’s mothers: those with at least a 
child aged 6 to 11 and no children less than 6, and those with at least a child aged 12 to 17 and no 
children less than 12; and comparative groups of mothers from the RofC and Ontario. We find that 
the program had substantial dynamic labour supply effects on mothers in Québec, in particular for 
cohorts of mothers who had a high probability of receiving subsidies from the child’s birth to his/her 
fifth birthday. For example, we find that the policy increased annual hours worked in 2004 for 
mothers with at least one child aged 6 to 11 years-old in Québec by 217 hours. Interestingly, 
Lefebvre and Merrigan (2008) find that the impact of the policy on all mothers with at least one child 
1 to 5 years old to be 231 hours in 2002. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly describes Québec’s childcare regimes 
(preschool subsidies program, kindergarten policy changes started in 1997) and changes in the 
utilization of these services by families with preschool children. Section 3 reviews some of the 
relevant studies on the effects of day care subsidies on mothers’ labour supply. Section 4 presents 
and explains the econometric strategy to estimate the dynamic effects of the policy. In Section 5, the 
data set is presented and descriptive statistics are shown as an introduction to Section 6 where the 
estimates of the long-term effects of the program appear. The paper concludes with a discussion of 
the results and final remarks. 
2. Childcare policy in Québec and across Canada 
Several measures can be used to reduce the burden of childcare expenditures and encourage the 
labour market participation of mothers with young children. In Canada, two major policy instruments 
have been implemented over the last 20 years: (1) at the federal and provincial level, a fiscal 
deduction or tax credits for day care expenses; (2) at the provincial level, childcare fee subsidies that 
depend on family income and are geared to low-income families. In some provinces, small subsidies 
are directed to licensed centers and regulated day care providers and are based on start-up costs, 
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fixed costs of providing childcare and costs that vary per number of children. As described lower, 
this last approach was favored in Québec for the implementation of its low-fee policy and as this 
policy became a universal childcare policy over the years, very large subsidies were made available 
to regulated day care providers. 
Québec’s universal childcare policy for preschool children 
On September 1 1997 licensed and regulated childcare facilities (not-for-profit centers, family-
based day care and for-profit day care center), under agreement with Québec’s Department of the 
Family, started offering spaces at the reduced fee of $5 per day per child for children aged 4 on 
September 30. On September 1 1998 and on September 1 1999 respectively, the 3-year-olds and 2-
year-olds (on September 30) became eligible for the low-fee spaces. On September 1 2000, all 
children aged less than 59 months (not entitled for kindergarten because their fifth birthday is after 
September 30) became eligible for reduced price childcare spaces. For the period analyzed, roughly 
80% of total costs were covered by the government subsidy. In 1996-1997, the subsidies which 
partially covered fixed costs and were directed to license and regulated childcare facilities amounted 
to 166 million dollars, while low-income families receiving a fee-subsidy according to eligibility 
criteria received 122 million dollars. Since 2002-2003, nearly all day care subsidies are directly 
attributed to day care providers (see Table A3 for the budgetary credits of the program and by setting 
from 1996 to 2009). Table 1 presents the evolution of the number of spaces partly or totally 
subsidized by the government from 1993-1994 to 2006-2007 by type of childcare setting as well as 
the total number of children in Québec for different age groups by year. We observe that non-profit 
services are the main beneficiaries of the policy. The yearly increases in subsidized spaces from 
1998 and onwards are all quite substantial. The table shows that in 2004-2005, 51% of all children 
aged 0 to 4 had access to a subsidized space or 64% of all children aged 1 to 4 (according to the 
number of spaces in March 2005). Table 2 presents the breakdown of children benefiting from the 
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program by age and setting in the years 2000 and 2004 and shows the number of children that have 
been exposed to subsidized childcare services over the years (these administrative data are not 
publicly available for the years before 2000). The last three columns of Table 2 indicate a notable 
regression of entry age in childcare and a large progression of the proportion of children having 
experienced childcare by age four. In 2000, 34% of all children aged 0 to 4 were in low-fee childcare 
services, 45% in 2003 (statistic not shown) and 49% in 2004. We cannot trace any such elaborate 
picture relative to the evolution of childcare services for other provinces in Canada, but the number 
of children in subsidized day care spaces is very small relative to Québec.1 
Kindergarten as day care 
Publicly provided (pre) kindergarten for (4) 5-year-olds implies an implicit subsidy for day care. 
All provinces offer publicly provided free kindergarten for 5-year-olds in a school setting under the 
auspices of the Department of Education. All programs are for a half-day (2 hours and 30 minutes) 
during the school year, except in Québec (which is for a full day since the fall of 1997), New-
Brunswick, and Nova-Scotia. In most provinces parents are free to register their child in kindergarten 
as it is not a legal requirement (a large majority of eligible children do attend kindergarten). In 
Ontario, most School Boards offer a half-day of junior kindergarten for 4-year-olds. Again, most 
eligible children attend these kindergartens. In Québec since the fall of 1997, almost all 5-year-olds 
attend full-time kindergarten while a large number attend before- after-school subsidized day care 
settings. Despite these differences, the only major change in kindergarten policy over the period of 
our study occurred in Québec. Furthermore, the fact that in Ontario most 4 and 5-year-olds are 
enrolled in (junior) kindergarten suggests that this province offers an interesting comparison group as 
an alternative to the whole of Canada. In addition Ontario is the most populous province with the 
                                                 
1 For some partial and tentative estimates, see the OECD (2004) study on Canadian childcare which 
deplores the state of patchy day care statistics in Canada. 
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highest per capita income but with an economy very similar to Québec being a very important 
exporter of manufactured goods to the United States. 
Childcare use in Canada: what are the arrangements and how much are used? 
It is difficult to obtain a larger picture of day care utilization, arrangements, and reasons for the 
use of day care across Canada. The last national survey on childcare use was conducted in 1988. 
Other than licensed centers and family-based regulated day care, parents can choose unregulated day 
care in their own home or in someone else’s home by a relative or by a non-relative. Provincial and 
federal policies provide tax relief for childcare spending as long as receipts are presented to income 
tax authorities. 
The NLSCY asks parents if they use childcare services for the purpose of studying or work and 
for each mode of childcare used, the number of hours per week. Figure 1 presents graphs for Québec 
and the others provinces (RofC) of the principal care (mutually exclusive) arrangements used by 
parents with children aged 0 to 5 for the 6 cycles of the NLSCY. From the third wave of the survey 
(1997-1998) on, it appears that a larger percentage of Québec’s children are in center-based care 
(including before- and after-school care) relatively to the RofC, and that this type of care is growing 
rapidly in Québec compared to the RofC where this arrangement ranks third. Family-based day care 
outside of the child’s own home is the most widely used mode of day care across Canada. Figure 2 
graphs the mean hours per week (children are attributed 0 hours if parents do not report use of 
childcare) children spend in the primary care arrangement, by children’s age, for Québec and the 
RofC. As could be expected looking at the shifts affecting the principal mode of care, there is a large 
increase in the average hours children spend in day care for each age group (less than 1 to 4 year-
olds) in Québec compared to the RofC since 1997-1998. Children aged 5, as expected, spend less 
time in childcare than 4-year-olds and the rise of hours in day care for them is smaller than for 
younger children. To summarize, the tables and figures presented so far show important shifts in day 
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care use, modes, and intensity occurring in Québec after the introduction of the childcare policy in 
1997 but not in the RofC. No such important policy changes for preschool children (including 
kindergarten) were enacted in the RofC over the years 1997 to 2004. 
3. A review of studies related to work incentives and childcare cost 
The decision of a mother with a preschool child to participate in the labour market necessarily 
involves some childcare arrangements. Although some parents have access to childcare by relatives 
at no monetary cost (or may coordinate their hours of work with their spouse in order not to use non-
parental childcare), most incur some childcare expenses in order to work. 
The labour force participation decision of mothers is particularly difficult to analyze because it is 
sensitive not only to the cost of childcare but also to its quality, availability, convenience, reliability, 
and security. Two main issues have been addressed in the related research literature. First is the 
relationship between the cost of childcare, the labour market decisions of mothers of young children 
and the choice of the principal mode of childcare. The other is how much does a childcare subsidy 
that reduces work-related expenses and increases a mother’s net wage increase the labour force 
participation rate of mothers? This last question has been studied in the context of transition from 
welfare to work and of policies helping low-income families to access employment, thus possibly 
reducing child poverty. 
Examining the American empirical evidence, Blau and Currie (2007) conclude that the link 
between childcare prices and labour supply is weak. There are a number of studies of the same 
nature in Europe: for France, Chroné et al. (2004); for Sweden, Gustafsson and Stafford (1992) and 
Lundin et al. (2007); for Italy, Del Boca (2002), Del Boca and Vuri (2006); for Germany, Wrohlich 
(2004); for England, Viitanem (2005). One of the main motivations for this literature is to infer, 
based on estimated models, the impact of varying childcare subsidies on employment. In most of the 
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studies, results show a small effect of prices on labour supply but a greater impact on the likelihood 
of using formal childcare. 
Some natural experiments provide more insight on the incentives affecting the employment 
decisions of mothers of preschool children. For the USA, Gelbach (2002) and Cascio (2006) study 
respectively the effects of kindergarten, and of the expansions of kindergartens into American public 
schools, on the employment rate of single mothers with a youngest child aged 5. Intuitively, this 
group of mothers should be more sensitive to “variations of the cost” and availability of childcare, 
since their budget/time constraint is generally tighter than that of married women. Both studies find 
positive effects of kindergarten on the employment rate of these single mothers. In Gelbach’s case, 
free kindergarten increases the employment rate of single mothers of preschool children by 4 to 5 
percentage points, while the positive effects range from 7.3 to 8.1 points for Cascio. For Argentina, 
Berlinski and Galiani (2007) analyzing a large expansion of pre-primary school facilities between 
1991 and 2001 obtain similar results for maternal employment conditional on full tape-up of the new 
places. However, these three studies do not examine life-cycle considerations of the policy. 
For Norway, Schone (2004) exploits the introduction of a new family policy program with a 
different motivation and work disincentives. From January 1999 on, all parents with 1 and 2- year-
olds who did not use publicly subsidized day care became entitled to a ‘‘cash-for-care’’ (CFC) 
subsidy. DD and DDD estimates show the effect of the CFC-subsidy to be a decrease of 8 points in 
participation rates of eligible mothers. As suggested by the author, a natural extension of the study 
would be to examine if the CFC-subsidy has permanent effects or if mothers do return to work when 
the CFC-period ends. For France, Piketty (2005) analyzes the extension of a similar parental home-
care allowance, for up to three years, (the “Allocation Parentale d’Éducation”- APE started in 1985-
1987 for mothers having a third child who decide to stop working. In 1994, the program was 
extended to mothers giving birth to a second child (for families with a first child aged less than 3). 
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His estimates suggest that for women with a second child born after July 1994, labour force 
participation of eligible mothers decreased between 11 and 19 points depending on socio-economic 
controls and trends included in the regressions. When the second child is 36 months old, Piketty’s 
results show that there are no dynamic effects. Most mothers with two children return to their 
previous job and this, in turn, reflects the important job protection “insiders” benefit from in France’s 
rigid labour market. 
Lefebvre and Merrigan (2008), as well as Baker et al. (2005), use DD methods and estimate a 
strong positive impact of Québec’s universal childcare policy on the labour supply of mothers with 
preschool children. These papers identify the effects of a universal childcare policy using Québec’s 
policy as a natural experiment. Therefore, they do not rely on structural modeling for the 
identification of the policy’s effects and simultaneity issues are less relevant in these analyses. Also, 
the price reduction of childcare costs is large and clearly exogenous. Lefebvre and Merrigan (2008) 
estimate the short-term effects from 1999 to 2002 of the childcare policy with the same data set used 
in this paper. The main results are found for a sample of mothers with at least one child aged 
between 1 and 5. They show that for hours, earnings, and weeks, the effects of the policy 
substantially increase each year from 1999 to 2002 as more spaces are created. Hence, the largest 
impacts are observed in 2002 when the number of subsidized childcare spaces reached their 
maximum over the period studied. In 2002, the effects on participation, earnings, annual hours and 
weeks worked of the childcare policy are respectively between 8.1 and 12 percentage points, $5,000-
$6,000 (2001 dollars), 231 to 270 annual hours at work, and 5 to 6 annual weeks at work. 
4. Conceptual issues and econometric modeling 
Conceptual issues 
In a static model of labour supply, the Québec child care policy should have no effect on the 
labour supply of mothers without any children of preschool age because it is one-off and 
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“temporary”. Only a dynamic model can explain policy effects on these mothers. In order to explain 
the dynamic effects of the policy and for the purpose of clarity, it is helpful to describe in detail the 
change in policy. 
Before the “$5 per day regime”, refundable tax credits based on child care expenses and family 
income at the provincial level (in Québec)2 and a deduction of childcare expenses for the lowest 
earner at the federal level were the core of childcare policy. The declared child care expenses used to 
compute deductions and credits are capped in both federal and provincial returns. The basic effect of 
these policies is to produce non-linearities in family or individual budget constraints for households 
with preschool children and increase the net wage of working mothers. 
Under the new regime, a subsidized space in an authorized childcare facility cost $5 per day for 
10 to 11 hours of day care. However, the parents had to commit to 260 days per year to keep their 
space all year. Given that almost all parents use less than 50 hours of childcare per week, the policy 
basically introduced a fixed cost of $1,300 per year for the use of a subsidized space. On the other 
hand, it substantially increases the net wage of mothers who obtained such a space. Both the 
provincial tax credit for childcare expenses and federal deduction remained in the tax form after the 
change in policy. However, expenses in a subsidized facility cannot be used for the provincial tax 
credit but can be deducted in the federal return. 
The approximate gross cost for day care services in child care centers was between $20 and $25 
per day before the new childcare regime. The price in unregulated family settings and by “nannies” 
is more difficult to ascertain. Baril, Lefebvre and Merrigan (2003) show that for a middle-income 
family who sent receipts to both federal and provincial governments, the estimated net daily price for 
childcare was approximately $11 per day for a $22 per day gross price. For the highest income 
                                                 
2 At the provincial level, only Québec has a tax credit for childcare expenses; in the other provinces 
it is a fiscal deduction. 
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families, the net price would have been approximately $16 per day, while for working families with 
the lowest income, the net price was approximately $5 per day. Welfare mothers on the path back to 
participation paid $3 per day, but this price remained at $3 after the regime switch. Therefore, the 
reduction in price was very important for middle and high income families using income tax credits 
and deductions. 
Our understanding is that before the new regime a non negligible proportion of families were 
using unregulated providers and informal services without receipts. For those families, we presume 
the price decrease was even more important. Also, anecdotal evidence suggests that liquidity 
constraints played a role in labour force participation choices. Finally, low-priced child care services 
were simply hard to find. In this regard, the provincial government, in addition to subsidizing 
approximately 80% of the operating cost of childcare facilities, also spent substantial amounts for the 
construction of childcare not-for-profit centers, thus increasing the supply of spaces. 
In order for the policy to cause changes in the labour supply of mothers with children in school 
and no children of preschool ages, it is necessary that some of these mothers who integrated or 
reintegrated permanently the labour market when the child is of preschool age in the new regime 
would not have reintegrated the labour market, even when the child started grade school in the 
counterfactual situation. 
Of course, under the new policy, effects differ depending on the labour supply choice in the 
counterfactual world of no “$5/day day care”. When the policy was implemented for 4- and 5-year-
olds in September of 1997, a majority of mothers with children of these ages were already working. 
In fact, in the first year of the policy no new spaces were created (Table 1). The only beneficiaries 
were families with a child care space for their 4-year-old. For these mothers, the dynamics are less 
interesting. In a standard life cycle, the policy corresponds to a temporary unforeseen change in the 
budget constraint that will last for two years (one year of subsidized child care and one year of full 
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time free kindergarten) and of additional expected changes in the budget constraint for several years 
if the mother expects to have children later. The policy will not have any effect on participation for 
these women, but it could have an effect on hours worked, and its sign will be ambiguous. Most 
studies find that the causal impact of increased wages at the intensive margin of labour supply is 
small. 
For many mothers not participating, under the old regime, several expect returning or start to 
work when the child enters grade school. In this case, the new policy has an unambiguous policy 
effect on participation when the child is 4, but they would, under any realistic assumptions, also 
participate when the child starts school, new policy or not. To find an effect on participation after all 
children leave preschool, we must ask why mothers who, under the old regime, would not have 
reentered or start working even when all children are in grade school, reenter or enter the labour 
market in the new situation? We believe that the answer lies with human capital. For periods with 
lower childcare costs, work yields higher consumption. But participation will also stop the 
depreciation of human capital accumulated in school and in former jobs, and it also permits the 
accumulation of new human capital acquired on the job. This changes the expected evolution of 
future wages so that women who never expected to work while raising children re-evaluate their life-
time utility and return or start working. The increase in work experience (Gladden and Taber, 2000, 
2006) can increase real wages and thus increase labour supply for several periods. Habit persistence 
(Shaw, 1994; Boyer, 1991) can also lead to permanent effects of short-term increases in labour 
supply. This paper does not seek to identify which mechanisms are at play but to empirically 
evaluate, if any, the life-cycle effects of Québec’s universal childcare policy. We believe that the 
case of Québec’s policy is very well suited to find these dynamic effects because the incentive 
switch (relative to the RofC) is turned off exogenously once the child starts school, and because this 
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low-fee childcare policy has significantly enhanced the labour supply of mothers with preschool 
children. 
Some of the preceding referenced studies have shown that Québec’s universal childcare program 
had a strong impact on the labour supply of mothers with preschool children. And, as can be seen in 
Figures 1 and 2, the policy greatly affected the main mode of care chosen by parents and the number 
of hours children spend in day care. Hence it is important to keep in mind that, because of the 
substantial increases of regulated day care spaces that occurred over time, it is more likely that 
mothers of 6 to 11-year-olds with no children aged less than 6 and belonging to the 2004 cohort, 
have benefited substantially more from the childcare policy relatively to the preceding cohorts. 
Furthermore, because of the policy’s gradual implementation, the number of total additional hours of 
day care use because of the policy is surely much higher for the 2004 cohort than for the 2002 
cohort. 
In the introduction, we mentioned that the new policy includes a $5 per day for before- and after-
school day care program. Theoretically, this aspect of the policy could also affect the labour supply 
of mothers with only children in school. However, the price change was much smaller and could 
only marginally affect mothers’ labour supply decisions, possibly at the intensive margin, which in 
general is shown to be considerably inelastic to wage changes in past econometric work. 
Econometric evidence presented in a later section will support the hypothesis that the before and 
after-school program had no effect on labour supply. 
Conceivably, the policy could have incited families from other provinces to move to Québec. 
However, migration in Québec from other provinces is very low because of the language barrier 
since 80% of the population in Québec is French speaking. Similarly, fertility behavior is not at issue 
because fertility rates are low and have been nearly constant from 1997 to 2005 in both the RofC and 
Québec. 
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Our a priori hypothesis about the policy’s long-term effects is that its gradual implementation 
should be reflected by a pattern of increasing effects over time as found for mothers with pre-school 
children. The labour supply of “recent” cohorts of mothers with 6 to 11-year-olds and no children 
aged less than 6 should be more responsive to the policy than “older” ones, if the policy is effective 
in the long-term. From 1999 onwards, mothers from Québec in this sample have potentially 
benefited from the policy. It is important to include a specification where the long-term effects of the 
policy change for the post-policy years because each cohort of mothers was treated differently. For 
example, mothers from the 1999 cohort with a child who is 6 benefited from the policy of a free full-
time kindergarten when the child was 5 in 1998, and from subsidized day care when he/she was 4 in 
1997. For the 2000 cohort, mothers with a child aged 6 benefited from subsidized day care in 1998 
and free full-time kindergarten in 1999. For the 2001 cohort, mothers with a child aged 6 benefited 
from subsidized day care in 1998 and 1999 and free full-time kindergarten in 2000; mothers with a 
child who is 7 benefited from the free full-time kindergarten in 1999 and subsidized day care in 
1998, and so on. 
The first part of our econometric strategy to estimate the policy’s potential long-term effects is 
to compare the labour outcomes of Québec’s mothers with at least one child aged between 6 and 11 
and no children less than 6, to similar mothers in the RofC from 1996 to 2004 (DD estimators). The 
second part of our econometric strategy consists in verifying the robustness of the results obtained in 
the first part by adding another comparison group of mothers not affected by Québec’s policy: 
mothers with at least one child aged between 12 and 17 and no children less than 12. Therefore we 
also estimate DDD models. Clearly, a more interesting strategy would have been to compare mothers 
by age of the children because the policy was implemented gradually on the basis of the age of 
children. Unfortunately, the SLID does not supply a sufficient number of observations in Québec to 
proceed with such an analysis. 
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Econometric modeling 
Our primary econometric approach is based on a DD procedure that is now well established in 
labour economics (Angrist et Krueger, 1999). The year 1999, for reasons explained in the section on 
conceptual issues, can be considered as the first year of possible life-cycle effects. In order to assess 
these effects, we turn to a DD specification, differentiated by period, presented by Francesconi and 
Van der Klaauw (2007): 
Yit = α + θQi + γI(t≥s) + ∑
=
2004
1999t
ititt QDβ +Φ′ Xit + εit.   (1) 
The life-cycle effects can be represented by a series of year-specific dummies from 1999 to 2004 
interacted with a Québec dummy, thus reflecting the gradual increases in the number of regulated 
day care spaces and the increasing numbers of mothers having benefited from the policy. The 
parameter tβ  represents a time-specific effect of the policy; Xit is a vector of socioeconomic control 
variables and Φ is a vector of parameters. Qit takes the value of 1 if the mother lives in Québec, 0 
otherwise; Iit is an indicator function which takes the value of 1 if the period of observation includes 
mothers having benefited from the policy (1999 to 2004) and Dit are yearly dummy variables. Yit 
represents different labour market outcomes. The following restrictions yield the standard DD 
estimator: β1999= β2000= β2001 =β2002= β2003= β2004. For sake of robustness, we also present estimations 
where Ontarian mothers are an alternative control group to all RofC mothers. 
To test the sensitivity of the results to different specifications, we estimate two models. The first 
is a standard DD specification where the policy effects are constrained to be the same for each 
period. The second is a DD specification where the policy effects are unconstrained by period. In 
order to measure the robustness of the results obtained with the DD estimators we add an additional 
control group to our data set: mothers with at least one child aged 12 to 17 and no younger child than 
12. We then estimate DDD models. This will purge from the DD estimators any post-policy effect 
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specific to Québec that is different from the childcare policy. The DDD model differentiated by 
period becomes: 
Yit = β0 + β1Qit + β2 I(t≥s)+β3Cit+ β4Qit I(t≥s)+ β5QitCit + β6Cit I(t≥s) + ∑
=
2004
1999t
itititt QCDβ +Φ′ Xit + εit  (2) 
In this model, we add the variable Cit, which takes the value of 1, if there is a child between 6 and 
11 in the household, and 0 otherwise. Finally, we estimated the models with time-trends that are 
specific to Québec and the RofC. Because, the results were not sensitive to the inclusion of these 
trends, we discuss the results without them. 
5. Data set 
The data used for our empirical analysis are provided by Statistics Canada’s Longitudinal Survey 
of Labour and Income Dynamics (SLID), a nationwide survey on household and personal income as 
well as labour force participation. The individuals for this survey are sampled through the Labour 
Force Survey (LFS) which covers all provinces with the exception of the three Territories, native 
reserves, the military and individuals residing in institutions. Conceived originally as a rotating panel 
survey, the first panel was produced in 1993. The same individuals were interviewed every year from 
1993 to 1998. In 1996, a second panel was introduced covering the years 1996 to 2001. In 1999, a 
third panel was started to replace the first cohort of respondents. The last panel started in 2002. Since 
1996, the SLID is composed of two cohorts representative of the total population of individuals aged 
16 or more. 
First, from the years 1996 to 2004 (latest year the data set is available), we sampled mothers aged 
between 18 and 55 years-old in a single-mother or two-parent family, with at least one child less than 
18. Second, we kept only mothers with a least one child aged 6 to 11 and with no children less than 6 
for DD regressions and added mothers with at least one child 12 to 17 and no children less than 12 
for DDD regressions. Finally, we separated our sample of mothers by two levels of education which 
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we define as follows: “high-education” mothers (a university diploma or more) and “low-education” 
mothers (those with less than a university education). Four labour market variables were chosen to 
analyze labour supply outcomes: 1. Labour market participation for two of the 12 months of the year 
(the information is available for any of the twelve months); 2. Number of weeks worked during the 
year; 3. Number of hours worked during the year; 4. Annual earnings gained from all jobs (2001 
dollars). Since we are using mothers as the unit of analysis, all means and regression results use the 
weights computed by Statistics Canada for the analysis of job market variables. Because OLS 
standard errors underestimate standard errors (see Donald and Lang, 2007), all standard errors are 
bootstrapped using Statistics Canada’s bootstrap weights. 
A descriptive analysis 
Figures 3A to 6A contain graphs tracing the time series evolution of the four labour market 
variables studied for the years 1996 to 2004 for mothers in Québec, the RofC and Ontario. Figures 
3B to 6B are done by the education levels of mothers. For purposes of concision, we constrain our 
descriptive analysis to the sample of mothers with at least one child between 6 and 11 and no 
children less than 6. 
Figure 3A presents the percentage of all mothers working in the month of April in Québec, the 
Rest of Canada (RofC) and Ontario (descriptive statistics and estimation results are very similar 
when using other months). It shows that the gap between participation rates for the RofC and Québec 
is quite important and stable from 1996 to 2001. From 2001 on, we observe that the participation rate 
for the RofC is rather stagnant while it increases rapidly in Québec. Figure 3B indicates that the 
driving force behind these increases is mainly the rise in participation of low-education mothers. The 
participation rate of high-education mothers is mostly unchanged by Québec’s childcare policy and it 
is roughly similar to that of mothers with the same level of education from the RofC. On the 
contrary, the participation rate of Québec’s mothers with no university education jumps dramatically 
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starting in 2002 from around 65% in 2001 to approximately 75% in 2004. The new opportunity 
offered by subsidized childcare seems to have strongly modified their working behavior in the long 
run. In the RofC, the participation rate of low-education mothers decreases from 2001, with an 
important rebound in 2004. In the rest of this section we will concentrate on the figures by education 
levels of the mothers because of their importance for our econometric results. 
Figures 4A-B and 5A-B present the same time series but for annual average weeks worked and 
hours worked. Starting in 2000-2001, as can be seen on the Figures 4B and 5B, there is a marked 
growth for weeks and hours worked by low-education mothers in Québec relatively to the RofC. 
Looking at the same figures, one clearly sees that these two labour variables are roughly the same in 
Québec and the RofC for high-education mothers. Thus, the patterns by education level display 
evidence of a strong, long lasting, positive effect of the policy for low-education mothers. It is not 
clear the policy had any long-term impact on the average working weeks and hours of more educated 
mothers. Not surprisingly, the patterns for hours (Figures 5) closely mimic the patterns for weeks 
(Figures 4). 
The Figures 6A and 6B present the time series for annual average earnings ($2001). Figure 6B 
shows an earning gap in favor of low-education mothers from the RofC during almost the entire 
period of study. However, having stagnated around at $15,000 from 1996 to 2001, the earnings of 
Québec’s low-education mothers start rising in 2002 and definitively close the gap a year later. 
The two panels of Tables A1 and A2 (for the RofC and for Québec, and by ages of children) 
present the mean values in the regressions. These statistics show that mothers in both regions are 
very similar except for the proportion in single-parent households, immigration status, and university 
educated mothers at the beginning of the period of study. The Tables identify the socioeconomic 
control variable used: provinces, family and immigration (not born in Canada) status, age group and 
education level of the mother, number of children in household and size of community. 
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6. Econometric results 
Four specifications were estimated for each dependent variable. The first is a specification with 
constant program effects over the years 1999 to 2004 (β1999 = β2000=…= β2004) (see equations (1) and 
(2)). The second specification lets policy effects vary by year for the years 1999 to 2004. Finally the 
third and fourth specifications are identical to the first and second specifications except that we 
constrain the effects of the policy to be 0 for the years 1999 to 2001. 
Before commenting on the specification we retain for a detailed analysis we briefly discuss the 
results from a more general specification and a DDD approach, equation (2) (conclusions from DD 
estimates are basically the same), appearing in Table 3. We concentrate our remarks on the 
specification with year specific effects of the policy, under the label “Unequal Policy Effects”, that 
shows an increasing pattern for the size of the effects, as each year more and more mothers having 
benefited from the day care policy are present in the sample. In the final year, 2004, all women with 
children 6 to 11 had benefited from the policy, although for a different numbers of years. However, 
for the first three years, 1999 to 2001, the effects of the policy are very small and statistically 
insignificant. Two reasons can explain this: (1) a smaller proportion of women, compared to 2002-
2004 have benefited from the policy; (2) Less human capital gains from returning or starting work 
when the child is younger. These results support our assumption that the before- and after-school day 
care program had no labour supply effects as this policy was implemented in late 1997 and thus 
could have affected labour supply decisions of mothers with children in school. Therefore, our 
analysis will focus on the results obtained from specifications where the year-specific effects of the 
policy for 1999, 2000, and 2001 are constrained to be null (Tables 4 and 5). This constraint 
substantially lowers the standard errors for the estimated effects for years 2002 to 2004. 
Tables 4 and 5 present, respectively for all mothers and for two sub-samples of mothers: with no 
university education (noted LED) and university educated (noted HED), the estimated effects of the 
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policy for all samples and specifications computed with the DD and DDD methods. Under the 
columns labeled DD, mothers in Québec with at least one child 6 to 11 and no child less than 6 are 
compared to similar mothers from the RofC. Under the columns labeled DDD, we add mothers with 
at least one child between 12 and 17 and no child less than 12 to the DD sample. 
We start our discussion of the DD results with the full sample of mothers (Table 4, panels A, B, 
C and D), under the label Equal policy effects. For all labour supply indicators except earnings 
(Panel D), we observe a positive albeit, in a majority of cases, not very statistically significant effect 
of the policy. The effects are estimated to be slightly higher with the DDD method, but standard 
errors are higher as well. For participation (Table 3, panel A) and for the DD and DDD estimators 
with equal effects of the policy respectively, we find that the policy increased participation by 
approximately 5 and 6 points. This, in turn, means that the participation rate of Québec’s mothers 
would have been 70% or 69% without the program. Given that the effect of the child care program is 
clearly heterogeneous, we interpret our effects as treatment on the treated effects. 
Under the label, Unequal policy effects, we find that the DD effects of the program increased 
from 2002 to 2003, but remained stable from 2003 and 2004. Statistical significance is observed only 
for 2003. The DD effects for 2002, 2003, and 2004, are respectively 3.3 points, 6 points and 5.6 
points for participation. The DDD effects (Table 4, panel A, column 4) are slightly higher. The 
pattern of increasing effects is clearer for annual weeks and hours worked. For annual hours worked 
(Table 4, panel C, column 3), the year-specific DD effects of the policy are 93, 91 and 145 hours. 
We estimate that without Québec’s policy the mean annual hours worked by Québec’s mothers 
would have been, for the years 2002, 2003 and 2004 respectively, 1,197, 1,203 and 1,229. The DDD 
effects are considerably higher for this case and significant for 2002 and 2003. For annual weeks 
worked (Table 4, panel B), the DD effects (column 3) are 2.02, 2.70 and 3.91 and, again, the DDD 
effects are higher. Only with the DDD estimator did we find marginally significant effects for 
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earnings (Table 4, panel D. columns 2 and 4), and they are quite large: $3,617 for the DDD estimator 
with equal effects; $3,915, $2,342 and $4,512 for the specification with year-specific effects. 
Therefore, the hypothesis that the effects should increase as more mothers within an age group 
benefit from the policy when their child or children were less than 6 is supported by the data. 
Three mechanisms are at play to explain the increasing pattern of effects. First, as time goes by, 
there are more mothers whose children could have been in subsidized care in the 6-11 age groups 
strictly because of age. Moreover, the number of subsidized places also increased every year from 
1999 to 2004 so that the probability of benefiting from a subsidized space, given the age of the child, 
was also increasing (see Tables 1 and 2). Human capital net gains are higher because more women in 
the later years could benefit from the program for several years when the child is of pre-school age. 
The specification with only Ontario’s mothers as the control group gives the same results (Table 
4, panels E, F, G and H) as with all other provinces. This is not surprising as approximately 40% of 
sampled mothers reside in Ontario. However, the estimated effects of the policy are found to be 
slightly larger and more effects are statistically significant. 
As one could expect looking at the Figures (3B, 4B, 5B and 6B) of the labour supply variables by 
education level of the mothers, the regression results by education level of the mothers in Table 5 are 
very revealing. They show that the program has long-term statistically significant effects on low-
education mothers. In almost all cases, the effects of the models are pronounced and statistically 
significant for these mothers. For instance, for this sample, the effects when unconstrained to be 
equal for participation in April (Table 5, panel A1, columns 3 and 4) are estimated to be, for the DD 
and DDD estimators and for the years 2002, 2003, and 2004 respectively, 3.8, 8.5 and 8.2 percentage 
points, and 7.6, 12.2 and 12.0 percentage points, the last two effects being statistically significant for 
both estimators. Without Québec’s universal childcare program and as a point of comparison, the 
April participation rate of less educated mothers for the years 2002, 2003 and 2004 would have been 
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respectively, 65,2% (61,4%), 66,5% (62,8%), and 66,8% (63%) judging by the values of the DD 
(DDD) estimator. For this same group of mothers and for unequal policy effects, the DD effects on 
hours are 126, 135, 208 (Table 5, panel C.1), while they are 231, 239 and 313 for the DDD estimator 
(Table 5, panel C.1). In all cases, the program’s effects on hours are statistically significant. The 
pattern for annual weeks worked (Table 5, panel B.1) is very similar to annual hours. Finally, only 
for the DDD estimates do we find large and significant effects of the policy on the annual earnings of 
less educated mothers (Table 5, panel D.1). To the contrary and whichever labour variable is 
considered, the policy effects are almost never statistically significant for high-education mothers 
(Table 5, panels A.2, B.2, C.2 and D.2). However, despite the large standard errors, they do point 
towards a negative effect of the policy, more consistent with a standard life-cycle theory of labour 
supply, where increased labour supply, during the period of the temporary incentive, will be 
followed by lower labour supplied financed by the additional savings. 
We perform joint tests of equality of policy effects between the less and more educated mothers 
and one main feature stands out. Except for the case of annual earnings, the null hypothesis of 
equality of effects between the two groups is more strongly rejected (lower p-values) with the DDD 
approach (test results are available from the authors). 
Therefore, the evidence supports the hypothesis of strong dynamic effects of the program. 
Although the difference in incentives to work between mothers in Québec and the RofC is no longer 
directly affected by the childcare policy, the policy seemingly continues to produce effects on labour 
supply. 
8. Concluding remarks 
In September 1997, the government of Québec implemented a low-fee childcare policy which 
has been enlarged over the years in terms of coverage (by age of child) and spaces, to become a truly 
universal childcare program. In the first years of the policy, it is well known that the program could 
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not satisfy all of the increased demand for low-fee spaces. The characteristics of the program explain 
why. Before the policy, the net price of day care varied with family income. In addition, several 
families did not receive the tax subsidies, as receipts were not supplied to tax authorities, the 
informal arrangement with their childcare provider being superior to an arrangement with receipts. 
Also, low-income families could be liquidity-constrained and have problems accessing reliable day 
care, so the policy was attractive to this group as well. Parents using free day care provided by a 
relative could prefer a subsidized space because of the long hours that are available in these settings 
as well as the 5 days per week (260 days per year) operating conditions. For mothers working full-
time, taking into account work time, commuting time between the home, the day care facility and 
workplace (let us say 9 hours), the hourly cost of day care was (is) less than $0.60 per hour ($0.90 
per hour since 2004). Finally, the $5/$7 per day childcare providers could be seen as more reliable 
than a person at home as the service is licensed and regulated, and available every day of the week. 
All these factors explain why the policy had significant effects on the labour supply behavior of 
mothers and why parents were all demanding a subsidized space. In fact, the rationing of spaces in 
the early years of the program leads us to believe that the estimated effects of both the long and 
short-term effects of the program are smaller than the effects one would find for an “instantaneous” 
universal childcare policy. 
A few points must be made regarding the generalization of our results to other provinces or 
countries. As we mentioned throughout the paper, this policy was implemented during a period 
(1996 to 2004) of strong real GDP growth so that aggregate labour demand increased, helping 
mothers induced by the policy to search for a job to find jobs in the labour market. It is not clear that 
such a policy would produce the same effects in countries with more sluggish economic growth. 
Also, and very importantly in our opinion, Québec’s labour market is (relatively) flexible, especially 
when compared to those of many continental European countries. In addition, in regions or countries 
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where most of the mothers out of the labour market stay at home because they strongly value 
personally rearing their child, any type of subsidy will have limited effectiveness. 
The effects of the policy cannot be strictly interpreted as the effects of a price change. Several 
features characterize the policy: the price change, the financial help to fund new childcare settings, 
and the increased wages for childcare workers. The last feature mainly explains why the average 
yearly subsidy to registered day care providers (including parent-fee-subsidy before 2002) increased 
from $3,888 for 1996-1997 to $8,117 per year for fiscal year 2006-2007 (see Table A.3). 
The Québec experiment provides a unique opportunity to identify the effects of childcare 
subsidies given that the scale of the program and the amount of resources dedicated by the provincial 
government. The public cost of the program increased from 0.16 percentage point of Québec’s GDP 
in 1996 to 0.57 percentage point in 2006. However, policy does not occur in a vacuum, and features 
other than the price change accompanied this policy during its implementation. This paper examined 
if Québec’s universal childcare policy had long-term impacts, taking into account its time-limited 
nature. The results support the hypothesis that this policy effectively had life-cycle labour supply 
effects on mothers who benefited from the program when their child was less than 6. These effects, 
measured in terms of labour force participation, weeks, hours and work experience are estimated to 
be stronger and significant only for less educated mothers (not university educated). In general, 
significant effects for earned annual income were found only for the DDD estimators. And, again, 
the effects found were particularly strong and significant only for less educated mothers. Thus, our 
results suggest that a time-limited policy directed to all mothers with young children has dynamic 
effects over time. More interestingly, these effects only pertain to mothers who are not university 
educated and whose attachment to the labour market is traditionally weaker than that of university 
educated mothers. Although the study did not disentangle the roles that habit formation, work 
experience or job tenure might play in the causation processes; these are promising avenues of 
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research given the results found in this paper. But the hurdles to realize such a project are difficult to 
overcome, even downplaying issues of selection and endogeneity related to experience and wages. 
Structural estimation methods must be used to separate experience effects from habit persistence. 
The main obstacle for the realization of this project is the absence of prices for childcare across 
Canada over the period of study. 
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Table 1 
Number of childcare regulated spaces and subsidized1 spaces for preschool children on March 31st by setting 
and number of children aged less than one year, 0 to 4 years and 5 years on July 1st, Québec, 1994-2006 
Spaces in not-for-profit 
network1 
Year 
Center Family-
based 
Spaces in for-profit 
center2 under 
agreement 
(not subsidized)3 
Total number of 
spaces at a 
reduced fee4 
Total number of children 
[less than 1 year], 
0-4 years and (5 years) 
1993-1994 
1994-1995 
1995-1996 
1996-1997 
1997-1998 
1998-1999 
1999-2000 
2000-2001 
2001-2002 
2002-2003 
2003-2004 
2004-2005 
2005-2006 
2006-2007 
Dec. 2007 
33,452 
34,545 
36,708 
36,101 
36,977 
39,436 
45,793 
51,988 
58,525 
63,339 
68,274 
72,057 
74,573 
75,934 
76,759 
15,253 
17,871 
19,479 
20,328 
21,761 
32,816 
44,882 
55,979 
62,193 
75,355 
82,044 
87,192 
89,011 
88,645 
88,728 
(15,665) 
(18,366) 
(19,842) 
17,629 (4,806) 
17,979 (5,587) 
23,861 (585) 
23,270 (1,208) 
24,578 (705) 
24,629 (976) 
24,740 (1,620) 
27,530 (1,907) 
30,131 (2,457) 
33,034 (3,487) 
34,027 (4,538) 
34,700 (4,960) 
64,370 
70,782 
76,029 
74,058 
76,7155 
96,1135 
113,5455 
132,545 
145,624 
163,434 
177,848 
189,380 
196,618 
198,606 
200,187 
[90,417] 480,098 (90,603) 
[87,258] 473,113 (96,973) 
[85,130] 460,657 (99,415) 
[79,724] 445,143 (98,853) 
[75,674] 428,297 (94,674) 
[73,599] 412,161 (91,453) 
[72,070] 397,971 (89,358) 
[73,699] 381,522 (87,111) 
[72,200] 373,264 (83,582) 
[73,600] 368,920 (79,015) 
[74,370] 371,028 (76,105) 
[75,206] 373,406 (76,130) 
[78,352] 379,658 (74,768) 
[82,981] 389,661 (75,590) 
NA 
Sources: Department of Family for number of spaces; Québec’s Institute of Statistics for number of children 
by age. 
1. This designation applies more strictly from September 1997. 2. From 1999 to 2003, the government froze 
the number of for-profit childcare centers under agreement, which also offered spaces at the $5 per day fee; 
few new spaces were added for this arrangement during this period. 3. Figures in parenthesis represent spaces 
in daycare center without an “agreement,” that are not subsidized but are licensed and regulated. Those 
centers are free to choose their daily fee. 4. The reduced ($5 per day fee) program began on September 1997 
for the children aged 4 by September. By January 1 2004, the daily fee was raised to $7. 5. The $5 per day fee 
policy was extended to the 3 years on September 1998, the 2 years on September 1999 and to children of all 
ages not eligible for kindergarten on September 2000 (fifth birthday after 30 September). 
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Table 2 
Breakdown of children in Québec attending ($5 per day) day care by age on September 30 and setting, March 
2000 and 2004, and number of children by age on July 1 2000 and 20041 
Number of children in  subsidized day care Ratios 
2000 2004 
Age of 
children 
in years Day 
care 
centre 
Family-
based 
Total 
(1) 
Day 
care 
centre 
Family-
based  
Total 
(2) 
Number of 
children in 
Québec 
2000 | 2004 
(3) | (4) 
(2)/(1) 
 
(5) 
(1)/(3) 
% 
(6) 
(2)/(4) 
% 
(7) 
74,157 | 74,287 
74,902 | 73,319 
78,180 | 74,207 
83,488 | 73,853 
88,699 | 75,579  
399,426|371,245 
1.22 
1.90 
1.40 
1.22 
1.16 
1.34 
16.5 
25.9 
36.5 
43.6 
42.6 
33.6 
20.0 
50.2 
53.9 
60.0 
58.2 
48.5 
<1 
1 
2 
3 
4 
0-4 
51 
Total 
4,925 
9,452 
16,308 
22,273 
25,177 
78,135 
819 
78,954 
7,303 
9,927 
12,121 
14,159 
12,111 
56,213 
2,504 
58,717 
12,228 
19,379 
28,519 
36,432 
37,790 
134,348 
3,323 
137,671 
5,345 
16,575 
21,320 
27,275 
30,375 
102,075 
1,065 
103,140 
9,575 
20,205 
18,670 
17,055 
13,590 
77,981 
1,185 
79,095 
14,920 
36,780 
39,990 
44,330 
43,965 
180,056 
2,179 
182,235 
Not relevant Not relevant 
Sources: Analysis of the Report of Activities submitted by the childcare services, 2000-2001 and 2003-2004, 
Department of Family; Québec’s Institute of Statistics for number of children by age, and authors’ 
calculations. 
1. About seven hundred 6-year-old kindergarten children are included and about half of the 5-year-old children 
are not in kindergarten 
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Table 3 
Estimated effects of childcare regime on Québec’s mothers’ labour force participation, annual weeks and hours 
worked, and annual earnings for DDD estimation1 
Equal policy 
effects 
DDD 
Unequal policy effects 
DDD 
Specification 
β1999-2004  or 
β2002-2004 
Β1999 β2000 β2001 β2002 β2003 β2004 
Participation (N=46,697) 0.019 -0.027 0.006 0.004 0.029 0.056 0.052 
Bootstrapped Standard error 0.039 0.041 0.042 0.040 0.045 0.045 0.050 
H0: Joint test of equal effects2 - 0.23 
Participation (N=46,697)3 0.062 - - - 0.046 0.073* 0.069 
Bootstrapped Standard error 0.040 - - - 0.041 0.041 0.048 
Weeks of work (N=46,697) 0.68 -1.59 -0.49 0.15 1.22 1.91 3.13 
Bootstrapped Standard error 2.00 2.10 2.08 2.09 2.33 2.31 2.49 
H0: Joint test of equal effects - 0.23 
Weeks of work (N=46,697)3 3.20 - - - 2.34 3.03 4.25* 
Bootstrapped Standard error 2.07 - - - 2.10 2.14 2.37 
Hours of work (N=44,777) 57 -70 -6 61 104 102 159 
Bootstrapped Standard error 85 86 90 89 97 95 104 
H0: Joint test of equal effects - 0.02 
Hours of work (N=44,777)3 180** - - - 162* 159 217** 
Bootstrapped Standard error 88 - - - 90 90 99 
H0: Joint test of equal effects - - 0.40 
Earnings (N=47,135) 1,919 520 1,912 1,311 2,936 1,365 3,541 
Bootstrapped Standard error 1,596 1,679 1,702 1,680 1,895 1,855 2,378 
H0: Joint test of equal effects - 0.26 
Earnings (N=47,135)3 3,617* - - - 3,915** 2,342 4,512* 
Bootstrapped Standard error 2,090 - - - 1,981 2,067 2,742 
H0: Joint test of equal effects - - 0.20 
1. Sample of mothers with at least one child 6 to 11 and no child less than 6 and mothers with at least one child 
12 to 18 and no children less than 12. 
2. All the tests show the p-values derived from a Chi-Square distribution (this also applies to the tests that 
follow). 
3. In this specification the year effects of 1999 to 2001 of Québec’s policy are constrained to be zero. All the 
parameters related to the policy are modified in order to take this change into account. 
Statistical significance: ***p<1%; **p<5%; *p<10%. 
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Table 4 
Estimated effects of childcare regime on Québec’s mothers’ labour force participation, annual weeks and 
hours worked, and annual earnings1 
Equal policy effects Unequal policy effects 
(1) DD (2)DDD (3) DD (4) DDD Specification 
β2002-2004 β2002 β2003 β2004 β2002 β2003 β2004 
 ALL MOTHERS 
PANEL A: Participation2 N=24,420/46,697 N=24,420 N=46,697 
Policy variables coefficients 0.049* 0.062 0.033 0.060* 0.056 0.046 0.073* 0.069 
Bootstrapped Standard error 0.027 0.040 0.030 0.030 0.035 0.041 0.041 0.048 
Joint test of equal policy effects3 - 0.63 0.63 
PANEL B: Weeks of work2 N=24,420/46,697 N=24,420 N=46,697 
Policy variables coefficients 2.87** 3.20 2.02 2.70* 3.91** 2.34 3.03 4.25* 
Bootstrapped Standard error 1.40 2.07 1.50 1.58 1.69 2.10 2.14 2.37 
Joint test of equal policy effects - 0.39 0.38 
PANEL C: Hours of work2 N=23,396/44,777 N=23,396 N=44,777 
Policy variables coefficients 110* 180** 93 91 145** 162* 159 217** 
Bootstrapped Standard error 56 88 63 61 68 90 90 99 
Joint test of equal policy effects - 0.44 0.40 
PANEL D: Earnings2 N=24,589/47,135 N=24,589 N=47,135 
Policy variables coefficients 1,161 3,617* 1,441 -125 2,088 3,915** 2,342 4,512*
Bootstrapped Standard error 1,433 2,090 1,482 1,453 2,114 1,981 2,067 2,742 
Joint test of equal policy effects - 0.20 0.20 
 MOTHERS from QUÉBEC and ONTARIO 
PANEL E: Participation2 N=11,811/22,502 N=11,811 N=22,502 
Policy variables coefficients 0.061* 0.073 0.047 0.072** 0.065* 0.059 0.084* 0.078 
Bootstrapped Standard error 0.031 0.045 0.034 0.033 0.038 0.046 0.046 0.052 
Joint test of equal policy effects - 0.68 0.66 
PANEL F: Weeks of work2 N=11,811/22,502 N=11,811 N=22,502 
Policy variables coefficients 3.42** 3.70 2.70 3.26* 4.33** 2.94 3.53 4.65* 
Bootstrapped Standard error 1.59 2.33 1.70 1.74 1.84 2.36 2.38 2.60 
Joint test of equal policy effects - 0.48 0.48 
PANEL G: Hours of work2 N=11,348/21,634 N=11,348 N=21,634 
Policy variables coefficients 137** 190* 124* 118* 169** 174* 170* 225** 
Bootstrapped Standard error 66 100 73 71 77 103 102 110 
Joint test of equal policy effects - 0.49 0.43 
PANEL H: Earnings2 N=11,910/22,760 N=11,910 N=22,760 
Policy variables coefficients 1,717 5,105** 2,122 450 2,500 5,493** 3,848 5,893*
Bootstrapped Standard error 1,829 2,525 1,862 1,841 2,403 2,423 2,504 3,098 
Joint test of equal policy effects - 0.19 0.20 
1. Sample of mothers with at least one child 6 to 11 and no child less than 6 and mothers for DD estimation and 
mothers with at least one child 6 to 11 and no child less than 6 and mothers with at least one child 12 to 18 and 
no children less than 12 for DDD estimation. 2. In this specification the year effects of 1999 to 2001 of 
Québec’s policy are constrained to be zero. All the parameters related to the policy are modified in order to take 
this change into account (this also applies to the results that follow). 3. All the tests show the p-values derived 
from a Chi-Square distribution (this also applies to the tests that follow). 
Statistical significance: ***p<1%; **p<5%; *p<10%. 
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Table 5 
Estimated effects of childcare regime on Québec’s mothers’ labour force participation, weeks worked, hours and 
annual earnings for four specifications by education level of the mother (LED=Less than university education; 
HED=University diploma or more)1 
Equal policy effects Unequal policy effects 
(1) DD (2) DDD (3) DD (4) DDD Specification 
β 2002-20041 β 2002 β 2003 β 2004 β 2002 β 2003 β 2004 
Participation 
PANEL A.1: LED2 N=20,414/39,354 N=20,414 N=39,354 
Policy variables coefficients 
(Bootstrapped Standard error) 
0.067** 
(0.031) 
0.105** 
(0.047) 
0.038 
(0.034) 
0.085** 
(0.034) 
0.082** 
(0.041) 
0.076 
(0.048) 
0.122** 
(0.049) 
0.120** 
(0.055) 
Joint test of equal effects3 - 0.32 0.32 
PANEL A.2: HED  N=4,006/7,343 N=4,006 N=7,343 
Policy variables coefficients2 
(Bootstrapped Standard error) 
-0.028 
(0.054) 
-0.116 
(0.071) 
0.007 
(0.065) 
-0.049 
(0.071) 
-0.042 
(0.064) 
-0.080 
(0.078) 
-0.136 
(0.086) 
-0.131 
(0.084) 
Joint test of equal effects - 0.70 0.69 
Weeks of work 
PANEL B.1: LED N=20,414/39,354 N=20,414 N=39,354 
Policy variables coefficients2 
(Bootstrapped Standard error) 
3.82** 
(1.59) 
5.36** 
(2.42) 
2.45 
(1.70) 
4.02** 
(1.77) 
5.11** 
(1.95) 
3.99 
(2.49) 
5.57** 
(2.50) 
6.64** 
(2.73) 
Joint test of equal effects - 0.31 0.31 
PANEL B.2: HED  N=4,006/7,343 N=4,006 N=7,343 
Policy variables coefficients2 
(Bootstrapped Standard error) 
-1.53 
(2.70) 
-6.45* 
(3.62) 
-0.30 
(2.82) 
-3.41 
(3.57) 
-1.12 
(3.17) 
-5.23 
(3.64) 
-8.33 
(4.35) 
-6.05 
(4.02) 
Joint test of equal effects - 0.39 0.40 
Hours of work 
PANEL C.1: LED N=19,588/37,795 N=19,588 N=37,795 
Policy variables coefficients2 
(Bootstrapped Standard error) 
156** 
(63) 
260*** 
(99) 
126* 
(72) 
135* 
(69) 
208** 
(77) 
231** 
(104) 
239** 
(102) 
313*** 
(110) 
Joint test of equal effects - 0.27 0.26 
PANEL C.2: HED  N=3,808/6,982 N=3,808 N=6,982 
Policy variables coefficients2 
(Bootstrapped Standard error) 
-138 
(125) 
-213 
(163) 
-107 
(137) 
-172 
(143) 
-140 
(148) 
-186 
(174) 
-247 
(176) 
-210 
(183) 
Joint test of equal effects - 0.84 0.86 
Earnings 
PANEL D.1: LED N=20,563/39,742 N=20,563 N=39,742 
Policy variables coefficients2 
(Bootstrapped Standard error) 
2,469* 
(1,324) 
5,559*** 
(1,880) 
2,094 
(1,387) 
1,840 
(1,401) 
3,497* 
(1,815) 
5,187*** 
(1,926) 
4,922** 
(1,920) 
6,592*** 
(2,267) 
Joint test of equal effects - 0.51 0.50 
PANEL D.2: HED N=4,026/7,393 N=4,026 N=7,393 
Policy variables coefficients2 
(Bootstrapped Standard error) 
-5,482 
(4,847) 
-6,986 
(7,204) 
-2,673 
(5,567) 
-10,000* 
(5,267) 
4,369 
(6,862) 
-4,207 
(6,825) 
-11,291 
(7,516) 
-6,007 
(9,318) 
Joint test of equal effects - 0.13 0.15 
1. Sample of mothers with at least one child 6 to 11 and no child less than 6 and mothers for DD estimation and 
mothers with at least one child 6 to 11 and no child less than 6 and mothers with at least one child 12 to 18 and no 
children less than 12 for DDD estimation. 2. In this specification the year effects of 1999 to 2001 of Québec’s 
policy are constrained to be zero. All the parameters related to the policy are modified in order to take this change 
into account (this also applies to the results that follow). 3. All the tests show the p-values derived from a Chi-
Square distribution (this also applies to the tests that follow). 
Statistical significance: ***p<1%; **p<5%; *p<10%. 
Table A1: Means of variables used in the regression: sample of mothers with at least one child aged 6 to 11 
and no child less than 6 for the Rest of Canada and Québec, 1996 to 2004 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Characteristics 
Rest of Canada 
Sample 
Ontario  
Newfound. & Labrador 
Prince Edward Islands  
Nova Scotia  
New Brunswick  
Manitoba  
Saskatchewan  
Alberta  
British-Columbia 
Single parent 
Immigrant 
18 to 25 years old 
26 to 30 years old 
31 to 35 years old 
36 to 55 years old 
Primary Education 
Secondary Diploma 
Post-secondary 
University Diploma 
One Child 
Two Children 
At least Three Child 
Rural 
30 000< inhabitants 
30 000 to 99 999 
100 000 to 499 999 
500 000 and more  
2,548 
0.38 
0.02 
0.01 
0.03 
0.03 
0.04 
0.03 
0.10 
0.13 
0.19 
0.24 
0.01 
0.07 
0.24 
0.67 
0.15 
0.23 
0.47 
0.15 
0.27 
0.50 
0.23 
0.18 
0.20 
0.11 
0.13 
0.38  
2,450 
0.38 
0.02 
0.01 
0.03 
0.03 
0.04 
0.03 
0.10 
0.13 
0.21 
0.23 
0.01 
0.08 
0.23 
0.69 
0.14 
0.20 
0.50 
0.15 
0.29 
0.48 
0.24 
0.19 
0.19 
0.10 
0.13 
0.39  
2,376 
0.40 
0.02 
0.01 
0.03 
0.03 
0.04 
0.03 
0.10 
0.13 
0.20 
0.24 
0.01 
0.06 
0.22 
0.71 
0.13 
0.20 
0.50 
0.17 
0.29 
0.48 
0.23 
0.20 
0.19 
0.11 
0.12 
0.39  
2,398 
0.38 
0.02 
0.01 
0.03 
0.03 
0.04 
0.03 
0.10 
0.13 
0.19 
0.21 
0.01 
0.07 
0.21 
0.72 
0.13 
0.22 
0.47 
0.17 
0.25 
0.52 
0.22 
0.21 
0.16 
0.10 
0.15 
0.39  
2,217 
0.39 
0.02 
0.01 
0.03 
0.03 
0.04 
0.03 
0.10 
0.13 
0.17 
0.19 
0.01 
0.05 
0.21 
0.74 
0.12 
0.21 
0.49 
0.19 
0.25 
0.52 
0.23 
0.22 
0.16 
0.10 
0.14 
0.38  
2,212 
0.38 
0.02 
0.01 
0.03 
0.03 
0.04 
0.03 
0.10 
0.11 
0.18 
0.19 
0.01 
0.06 
0.21 
0.73 
0.11 
0.20 
0.50 
0.19 
0.26 
0.51 
0.24 
0.21 
0.16 
0.10 
0.14 
0.39  
1,987 
0.38 
0.02 
0.00 
0.03 
0.03 
0.04 
0.03 
0.10 
0.12 
0.20 
0.24 
0.01 
0.06 
0.18 
0.75 
0.10 
0.21 
0.51 
0.18 
0.27 
0.50 
0.23 
0.20 
0.16 
0.10 
0.14 
0.39  
1,922 
0.40 
0.02 
0.00 
0.03 
0.03 
0.04 
0.03 
0.09 
0.13 
0.21 
0.25 
0.01 
0.05 
0.16 
0.78 
0.09 
0.18 
0.53 
0.20 
0.27 
0.50 
0.23 
0.21 
0.16 
0.09 
0.14 
0.40  
1,768 
0.40 
0.02 
0.00 
0.03 
0.02 
0.04 
0.03 
0.10 
0.12 
0.21 
0.24 
0.01 
0.05 
0.15 
0.79 
0.09 
0.17 
0.52 
0.22 
0.26 
0.49 
0.25 
0.21 
0.17 
0.09 
0.13 
0.40  
 Québec 
Sample 
% of Can. Pop. 
Single parent 
Immigrant 
18 to 30 years old 
31 to 35 years old 
36 to 55 years old 
Primary Education 
Secondary Diploma 
Post-secondary 
University Diploma 
One Child 
Two Children 
At least Three Child 
Rural 
30 000< inhabitants 
30 000 to 99 999 
100 000 to 499 999 
500 000 and more  
552 
0.24 
0.22 
0.12 
0.08 
0.25 
0.67 
0.24 
0.24 
0.43 
0.09 
0.33 
0.44 
0.23 
0.19 
0.15 
0.09 
0.05 
0.53  
527 
0.23 
0.22 
0.09 
0.07 
0.27 
0.67 
0.19 
0.25 
0.44 
0.11 
0.33 
0.45 
0.21 
0.20 
0.15 
0.09 
0.05 
0.51  
542 
0.22 
0.21 
0.09 
0.06 
0.31 
0.63 
0.19 
0.23 
0.45 
0.14 
0.30 
0.49 
0.21 
0.20 
0.16 
0.07 
0.05 
0.52  
574 
0.24 
0.23 
0.12 
0.07 
0.27 
0.66 
0.20 
0.23 
0.45 
0.13 
0.29 
0.49 
0.22 
0.24 
0.13 
0.08 
0.05 
0.49  
514 
0.23 
0.25 
0.12 
0.07 
0.23 
0.70 
0.18 
0.22 
0.47 
0.12 
0.25 
0.51 
0.24 
0.25 
0.15 
0.07 
0.04 
0.49  
541 
0.26 
0.24 
0.10 
0.07 
0.24 
0.69 
0.20 
0.20 
0.49 
0.12 
0.26 
0.53 
0.21 
0.25 
0.15 
0.07 
0.05 
0.49  
523 
0.25 
0.23 
0.11 
0.05 
0.21 
0.74 
0.16 
0.18 
0.48 
0.19 
0.26 
0.54 
0.20 
0.24 
0.12 
0.10 
0.06 
0.48  
472 
0.24 
0.21 
0.09 
0.06 
0.20 
0.75 
0.14 
0.16 
0.51 
0.19 
0.25 
0.51 
0.24 
0.25 
0.12 
0.09 
0.06 
0.48  
466 
0.25 
0.27 
0.09 
0.06 
0.19 
0.75 
0.13 
0.13 
0.50 
0.23 
0.29 
0.50 
0.20 
0.24 
0.11 
0.06 
0.07 
0.52  
Source: Author’s calculation from weighted cross-sectional micro-data sets of the SLID. 
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Table A2: Means of variables used in the regression: sample of mothers with at least one child aged 12 to 17 
and no child less than 12 for the Rest of Canada and Québec, 1996 to 2004 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Characteristics 
Rest of Canada 
Sample 
Ontario   
Newfound. & Labrador 
Prince Edward Islands  
Nova Scotia   
New Brunswick   
Manitoba   
Saskatchewan   
Alberta   
British-Columbia 
Single parent 
Immigrant 
18 to 35 years old 
36 to 55 years old 
Primary Education 
Secondary Diploma 
Post-secondary 
University Diploma 
One Child 
Two Children 
At least Three Child 
Rural 
30 000< inhabitants 
30 000 to 99 999 
100 000 to 499 999 
500 000 and more  
2,164 
0.35 
0.02 
0.00 
0.03 
0.03 
0.04 
0.03 
0.09 
0.13 
0.20 
0.26 
0.08 
0.92 
0.17 
0.22 
0.47 
0.15 
0.63 
0.32 
0.05 
0.20 
0.22 
0.10 
0.13 
0.35  
2,142 
0.35 
0.03 
0.00 
0.03 
0.03 
0.03 
0.03 
0.09 
0.13 
0.20 
0.23 
0.07 
0.93 
0.17 
0.21 
0.47 
0.16 
0.61 
0.34 
0.05 
0.22 
0.24 
0.10 
0.12 
0.33  
2,126 
0.36 
0.02 
0.00 
0.03 
0.03 
0.03 
0.04 
0.10 
0.12 
0.20 
0.23 
0.06 
0.94 
0.14 
0.20 
0.51 
0.15 
0.60 
0.35 
0.05 
0.22 
0.23 
0.10 
0.13 
0.33  
2,105 
0.36 
0.02 
0.00 
0.03 
0.03 
0.03 
0.04 
0.10 
0.13 
0.21 
0.25 
0.05 
0.95 
0.12 
0.23 
0.49 
0.17 
0.64 
0.32 
0.04 
0.23 
0.16 
0.10 
0.15 
0.37  
1,987 
0.38 
0.02 
0.00 
0.03 
0.03 
0.03 
0.03 
0.11 
0.13 
0.21 
0.24 
0.05 
0.95 
0.12 
0.22 
0.50 
0.16 
0.65 
0.30 
0.05 
0.23 
0.17 
0.09 
0.15 
0.37  
2,008 
0.38 
0.02 
0.00 
0.03 
0.03 
0.03 
0.03 
0.11 
0.13 
0.21 
0.23 
0.04 
0.96 
0.12 
0.21 
0.50 
0.17 
0.64 
0.32 
0.05 
0.22 
0.16 
0.10 
0.14 
0.38  
1,891 
0.39 
0.02 
0.00 
0.03 
0.02 
0.03 
0.03 
0.10 
0.14 
0.19 
0.24 
0.04 
0.96 
0.11 
0.23 
0.47 
0.19 
0.62 
0.34 
0.05 
0.19 
0.17 
0.10 
0.16 
0.38  
1,871 
0.38 
0.02 
0.00 
0.03 
0.02 
0.03 
0.03 
0.11 
0.13 
0.17 
0.22 
0.05 
0.95 
0.11 
0.22 
0.49 
0.18 
0.61 
0.34 
0.05 
0.20 
0.17 
0.09 
0.15 
0.38  
1,851 
0.39 
0.02 
0.00 
0.03 
0.02 
0.03 
0.03 
0.10 
0.13 
0.18 
0.22 
0.05 
0.95 
0.10 
0.22 
0.49 
0.18 
0.62 
0.33 
0.05 
0.20 
0.16 
0.10 
0.16 
0.38  
 Québec 
Sample 
% of Can. Pop. 
Single parent 
Immigrant 
18 to 35 years old 
36 to 55 years old 
Primary Education 
Secondary Diploma 
Post-secondary 
University Diploma 
One Child 
Two Children 
At least Three Child 
Rural 
30 000< inhabitants 
30 000 to 99 999 
100 000 to 499 999 
500 000 and more  
572 
0.29 
0.22 
0.11 
0.04 
0.96 
0.24 
0.25 
0.40 
0.12 
0.64 
0.33 
0.02 
0.21 
0.16 
0.09 
0.06 
0.49  
554 
0.28 
0.22 
0.10 
0.04 
0.96 
0.25 
0.20 
0.44 
0.11 
0.67 
0.29 
0.04 
0.23 
0.16 
0.08 
0.06 
0.47  
550 
0.28 
0.21 
0.11 
0.04 
0.96 
0.25 
0.22 
0.44 
0.08 
0.68 
0.28 
0.04 
0.21 
0.16 
0.10 
0.05 
0.48  
542 
0.25 
0.22 
0.11 
0.05 
0.95 
0.24 
0.23 
0.42 
0.11 
0.71 
0.28 
0.02 
0.19 
0.13 
0.08 
0.05 
0.55  
463 
0.22 
0.23 
0.08 
0.06 
0.94 
0.26 
0.20 
0.41 
0.12 
0.71 
0.27 
0.02 
0.20 
0.14 
0.08 
0.06 
0.52  
446 
0.23 
0.23 
0.09 
0.04 
0.96 
0.24 
0.18 
0.44 
0.14 
0.69 
0.27 
0.04 
0.22 
0.14 
0.08 
0.06 
0.50  
425 
0.23 
0.29 
0.16 
0.05 
0.95 
0.21 
0.22 
0.38 
0.19 
0.67 
0.27 
0.06 
0.20 
0.13 
0.05 
0.06 
0.56  
434 
0.24 
0.24 
0.14 
0.04 
0.96 
0.21 
0.22 
0.41 
0.16 
0.65 
0.29 
0.05 
0.22 
0.13 
0.06 
0.06 
0.53  
415 
0.23 
0.25 
0.13 
0.02 
0.98 
0.19 
0.22 
0.41 
0.18 
0.63 
0.32 
0.05 
0.24 
0.13 
0.07 
0.06 
0.51  
Source: Author’s calculation from weighted cross-sectional micro-data sets of the SLID. 
 36
Table A3 
Québec’s budgetary credits for the childcare program in millions of dollars by fiscal year (April to 
March), 1996 to 2006 
Not-for-profit 
network 
Fiscal year 
Center and family 
childcare 
For-profit 
centers 
Parent fee-subsidy 
for daycare and 
special grants in 
millions of $ 
Total 
subsidies1 
Subsidy per 
space in $ 
1996-1997 
1997-1998 
1998-1999 
1999-2000 
2000-2001 
2001-2002 
2002-2003 
2003-2004 
2004-2005 
2005-2006 
2006-2007 
2007-2008 
2008-2009 
160 
150 
334 
505 
695 
872 
1,019 
1,099 
1,162 
1,178 
1,288 
1,310 
1,370 
6 
5 
56 
110 
138 
148 
187 
211 
224 
252 
287 
312 
344 
122 
129 
80 
27 
11 
1 
≈ 0 
≈ 0 
≈ 0 
≈ 0 
≈ 0 
≈ 0 
≈ 0 
288 
294 
470 
642 
844 
1,020 
1,206 
1,3102 
1,3862 
1,4932 
1,6122 
1,6922 
1,7962 
3,888 
3,832 
4,890 
5,654 
6,376 
7,004 
7,379 
7,366 
7,319 
7,593 
8,114 
8,4523 
NA 
Sources: For total subsidy, Expenditure Budget (annual), Québec’s Treasury Board; for number of spaces, 
Table 1. 
1. The funding includes one-time grants (e.g. start-up), recurring operating grants to center (and regulated 
family childcare and agency administration fee), special needs funding, and other grants. 2. Including 
interest and capital charges for not-for-profit centers and government contributions to the retirement plan 
of employees in all centers. Since January 1st, the fee per day has been fixed at $7 instead of $5. 3. Spaces 
in December 2007. 
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Figure 1: Primary care arrangements, 0-5 year-olds, Québec and Rest of Canada, 1994-
2004 
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Figure 2: Mean hours per week in primary care arrangements by age of children, Québec 
(Q) and Rest of Canada (C), 1994-2004 
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Figure 3: Mother’s labour force participation in April, Québec and all other provinces 
(RofC), and Ontario, 1996-2004 
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Figure 4: Mother’s mean annual weeks worked, Québec and all other provinces (RofC), 
1996-2004 
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Figure 5: Mother’s mean annual hours worked, Québec and all other provinces (RofC), 
1996-2004 
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Figure 6: Mother’s mean annual earned income, Québec and all other provinces 
(RofC), 1996-2004 
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